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UNFIT TO LEARN? HOW LONG VIEW ORGANIZATIONS ADAPT TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL JOLTS 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Long view organizations have a technical core combining high levels of Woodwardian (1958) 
technological complexity and Thompsonian (1967) technological intensity. This significantly 
diminishes their capacity for operational flexibility and strategic adaptation. Little is known about 
how such organizations manage to learn from rare events. We shed light on this issue by reporting 
a thirteen-year longitudinal study of a major oil company, tracing its experiences with a socio-
political crisis from original preparations to learnings that did not fully materialize until years 
after the event. We use three alternate templates to interpret the organization’s struggle to 
maintain its technical core under conditions of fierce contestation by changing constituent groups 
and dwindling public support: (1) a stakeholder template mapping shifts in the salience of 
constituent groups that punctuate long-standing negotiated equilibria; (2) a legitimacy template 
showing migration towards new forms of legitimacy while old forms crumble; and (3) a 
capability template highlighting how pre-existing stocks of capabilities hinder learning before 
being supplanted by new ones. These templates are tied together in a set of integrative 
propositions stating how long view organizations learn from rare events. 
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THE PLIGHT OF THE LONG VIEW ORGANIZATION 
 
Notions like organizational learning and adaptation suggest that organizational effectiveness is at 
least in part dependent on organizations’ ability to adapt fast and decisively to events emanating 
from their environments. Many contributors have suggested that as long as organizations are 
‘flexible’ (Birkinshaw & Hagström, 2000) or ‘ambidextrous’ (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004), they 
are in good shape to cope with environmental jolts or capitalize on learning opportunities. Many 
organizations, however, are by design not flexible or ambidextrous, and thus apparently unable to 
adapt to or learn from rare events. As Weick (1991) puts it, such organizations “are not built to 
learn. Instead they are patterns of means-ends relations deliberately designed to make the same 
routine response to different stimuli, a pattern that is antithetical to learning in the traditional 
sense” (p. 119). Particularly resistant to adaptation and learning are organizations combining 
Woodwardian (1958) technological complexity – requiring them to make immense investments in 
facilities that are inherently difficult to redesign, with Thompsonian (1967) technological 
intensity – demanding them to durably uphold a negotiated truce with all external parties involved 
in the application of the technology. We denote such organizations as long view organizations (cf. 
Schwartz, 1998), and define them as social collectives that are necessitated by their core 
technologies and environmental interdependencies to organize for distant futures. 
 Long view organizations are comparatively vulnerable to cataclysmic upheavals. Due to 
the extraordinary technological and relational constraints they face, they have fewer defenses 
against environmental jolts – “transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee 
and whose impacts on organizations are disruptive and potentially inimical” (Meyer, 1982: 515) – 
than organizations with shorter planning cycles. Organizations that draw on highly complex, 
highly intense core technologies simply cannot shorten their planning cycle times or otherwise 
alter the pace and rhythm of their business decisions in the face of unusual experiences (cf. 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). They must thus somehow reconcile the conflicting demands of 
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adapting to jolts and working towards distant strategic objectives. This provokes the following 
research question: How do long view organizations adapt to environmental jolts? 
Studying long view organizations requires a research design that matches their experience 
of time. A cross-sectional study is unlikely to capture significant changes in an organization that 
is used to making business decisions with a 30 to 50 year time horizon. We thus decided in favor 
of a longitudinal set-up. We selected an archetypical long view organization – the Shell Group oil 
company – and tracked it intensively for thirteen years. Our observations commenced when it was 
preparing for what turned out to be one of the most severe socio-political crises in its century-
long history, notably: the Brent Spar controversy. Our interest lay not in Shell’s crisis handling 
skills, and our empirical focus will not principally be on the few months that Shell had to absorb 
the episode directly. Rather, we focus on the less immediate aftermath of the crisis: the slow but 
fundamental transformation that was triggered by the controversy but that far outlasted the crisis’ 
lifespan. The story of this transformation is monolithic, but far from monologic. We therefore use 
three alternate templates (Langley, 1999) – grounded in stakeholder theory, neo-institutional 
theory, and the resource-based view of the firm – to explore various themes in the voluminous 
qualitative data we collected. The upshot of this exercise is a set of integrative propositions 
stating how long view organizations adapt to environmental jolts. 
 
THEORY REVIEW: ADAPTATION IN LONG VIEW ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Long View Organizations 
All organizations rely on some form of technology to accomplish their goals. These technologies 
generally range from simple to complex (Woodward, 1958). Simple and intermediately complex 
technologies, such as artisanal craft production and industrial batch manufacturing, are 
comparatively flexible. This flexibility derives from their modularity, a quality which refers to the 
“degree to which a system’s components can be separated and recombined” (Schilling, 2000: 
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312). When organizations employing these technologies are confronted with an unusual 
experience, they can adapt to it by “reshuffling” their systemic elements in an attempt to restore 
their structural “fit” with environmental contingencies (Drazin and van de Ven, 1985). In 
contrast, organizations characterized by high levels of technological complexity, such as those 
involved with continuous process production (Woodward, 1958), tend to be less modular and thus 
relatively inflexible. Their rigidity derives from the tightness of the coupling between the various 
system elements, and from the rules comprising their systems architecture, which often prohibit 
the mixing and matching of components due to systemic needs for high reliability (Schilling, 
2000; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Organizations using highly complex technologies thus tend to 
adopt a long view (Schwartz, 1998), in an attempt to make the organization more robust against 
environmental disturbances to which they cannot adapt on short notice. 
 An additional factor limiting organizational flexibility is technological intensity 
(Thompson, 1967). Intensity denotes the extent to which the selection of organizational 
technologies, as well as their combination and the order in which they are put to use, are 
determined by feedback from the external parties involved in their application (Thompson, 1967: 
17-18). Intensive technologies are custom technologies, in that the success of their deployment 
depends on the approval they can muster from the unique coalition of constituents involved in 
each individual project. These dependencies inevitably have consequences for the organization’s 
adaptive potential (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). Organizations employing low-intensity 
technologies are comparatively flexible, as they can adapt their core technologies without having 
to take external interdependencies into account – given resource constraints. In contrast, high-
intensity organizations are relatively inflexible, as any decision they make to initiate 
technological change can realistically be blocked or at least hindered by third parties from their 
task and institutional environments. Organizations employing intense technologies must therefore 
focus on the longer term to negotiate some durable form of truce with the external parties on 
whose support they critically depend (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
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 Long view organizations thus adopt longer planning horizons and more distant strategic 
objectives than their peers, due to the fact that their core technologies are so complex and intense 
that they ‘forbid’ shorter-term orientations. Testifying to the relevance of the long view thematic 
is that many popular management scholars have found inspiration in it. Former Shell executive 
Peter Schwartz (1998), for example, has suggested that long view organizations can use scenario 
planning, “a tool for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative future environments in which 
one’s decisions might be played out” (p. 4), to prepare for rare events. Arie De Geus (1997), 
another Shell executive, has proposed that long view organizations owe their longevity to being 
“living companies,” willing to learn from all unusual experiences that surround them. Finally, Jim 
Collins and Jerry Porras (1994), consultants to Shell, have suggested that long view organizations 
need a unique vision, offering them a frame for interpreting unforeseen crises as well as a 
roadmap detailing how to conquer them. All these contributors see long view organizations as a 
unique subset of a wider population of organizations, which owe their exceptional qualities to the 
fact that their success and longevity are two sides of the same coin. 
 
Organizational Adaptation 
The concept of organizational adaptation refers to the processes by which organizations foresee, 
absorb, and recuperate from disturbances in their environments. An authoritative model of 
organizational adaptation has been suggested by Meyer (1982). This model is best seen as a pre-
theoretical template or handmaiden theory, in that it offers a basic chronological platform onto 
which alternate theoretical templates can be grafted in order to reflect on organizational 
adaptation from various theoretical angles. We add these theoretical implants at a later stage, but 
here we restrict ourselves to a brief description of Meyer’s model. It identifies three consecutive 
stages: (1) anticipation, (2) adaptation, and (3) readjustment. 
 During the anticipatory phase, several alternatives are open to organizations to prepare 
their members for eventualities. They may use early warning systems (Dutton and Ottensmeyer, 
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1987), environmental scanning techniques (Aguilar, 1967) or other types of competitive 
“antennae” to identify particular events. Alternatively, they may rely on forecasting systems such 
as scenario planning (Schwartz, 1998) or the Delphi method (Linstone and Turoff, 1975) to draw 
up contingency plans stating how the organization is supposed to act under various imaginable 
states of the world. Good intentions aside, however, it is not always possible, or necessary, to 
foresee exactly what is in the future. Rather than prepare for specific events, organizations may 
also build up a general-purpose “war chest” of internal slack resources (Cyert & March, 1963) or 
a “reservoir of goodwill” (Heugens et al., 2004) in the eyes of outsiders, which they can draw 
upon in the event they are confronted with an unforeseen shock.  
 During the adaptation phase, organizations cope with a jolt as it unfolds. As this usually 
involves decision-making under conditions of ambiguity, stress, and time pressure, adapting 
organizations tend to stick with what they know and enact only well-learnt responses (Heugens, 
2005; March and Simon, 1958). Analytically, this process is referred to as first-order change 
(Meyer, 1982). It is a conservative form of organizational adaptation, as the organization’s 
prevailing strategic orientation and systemic inertia bind it to change that is consistent with well-
established patterns in its history (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). Empirical evidence shows that 
first-order change is the dominant adaptation pattern for approximately 70 percent of all 
organizations, even under conditions of considerable upheaval (Meyer et al., 1990; Meyer et al., 
1994). Thus, during adaptation, organizations often limit themselves to conservative measures 
like: laying off redundant employees (Meyer, 1982); crafting a public display of control and 
mastery over the situation (Basu et al., 1999); and framing organizational measures in terms that 
cohere well with the value-sets of dominant stakeholders (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). 
 When environmental jolts subside, the readjustment phase sets in. Organizations then 
take stock of the consequences of their adaptations, and attempt to move back to a “business as 
usual” state of operations. This state is oftentimes not very different from the status quo ante, and 
first-order changes can rapidly dissolve again when organizations revert to their antecedent states 
 7
(Meyer, 1982). Only a fraction of all organizational adaptations will lead to strategic 
reorientations or other permanent changes to the underlying organizational architecture (Fiol and 
Lyles, 1985; Fox-Wolfgramm et al. 1998). When they do occur, however, episodes of 
‘framebreaking’ or ‘second-order’ change tend to allow a highly insightful window on how 
organizations develop complex new rules of operation, associations between previously untapped 
reservoirs of knowledge, and understandings of causation (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). 
 
Constraints on Adaptation  
Meyer’s (1982) model is helpful in terms of ordering and analyzing long view organizations’ 
adaptive efforts. Yet, high levels of technological complexity and intensity impose additional 
constraints on adaptation. These are crucially important, as they structurally limit long view 
organizations’ repertoire of strategic options, and thus effectively impose boundary conditions on 
their ability to learn from rare events. These conditions do not necessarily limit learning potential 
in an absolute sense, but they do constrain and direct it in predictable ways. We identify two such 
boundary conditions here, and describe how they influence learning abilities. 
A first boundary condition is high opportunity costs. Technological complexity reduces 
modularity (Schilling, 2000) and thus increases the specificity of the assets (Williamson, 1991) 
contained in the organization’s technical core. High opportunity costs are the result, as many 
investments in continuous process production systems are significantly less valuable in their next-
best use – provided that an alternative form of use is available in the first place. This practically 
rules out any short- to medium-term adaptations to the technical core, focusing organizational 
efforts on responses preserving the core’s integrity. These include sealing off the technical core 
from environmental influences (“buffering,” cf. Thompson, 1967: 18-20) and smoothing the 
amplitudes of these environmental disturbances themselves (“leveling,” cf. Thompson, 1967: 20-
21). Thus, our expectation is that long view organizations are more likely than their 
technologically less complex counterparts to be engaged in buffering and leveling activities. 
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A second boundary condition is external dependencies. Organizations are dependent on a 
specific party in their environment to the extent that they have a need for substantive or symbolic 
resources which the party can provide (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These dependencies are 
diminished when other parties can provide similar resources (Emerson, 1962). Dependencies 
weigh in more heavily under conditions of high technological intensity, as external parties are 
now not merely resource providers but also active participants in the process of technology 
application. To manage these dependencies, organizations employing intensive technologies have 
traditionally resorted to vertical integration (Thompson, 1967), quasi-vertical integration (Pfeffer 
and Nowak, 1976), and cooptation (Selznick, 1949). Long view organizations thus tend to adapt 
to jolts by inducing nominally independent parties to surrender part of their autonomy through 
mechanisms like absorption, contract, or interest-alignment. Hence, we expect long-view 
organizations to be more preoccupied with demanding forms of adaptation like external 
absorption, and less with simpler, less-exacting forms like dialogue. 
 
METHODS 
 
Empirical Setting: Shell Group and the Brent Spar Crisis 
The Royal Dutch Shell Group is the product of a 1907 merger between the Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company. Soon after its founding, Shell 
Group became the world’s leading oil company. It rapidly expanded internationally, becoming 
involved in exploration activities in the US, South America, and the Middle East. The Second 
World War threw the company in a deep crisis, as it saw many of its assets destroyed, occupied, 
or confiscated. Though reconstruction was prohibitively expensive, the post-war explosion in the 
civilian demand for oil products not only saved the company but also spurred a period of 
unprecedented growth. Shell Group transformed itself during the 1960s and 1970s from a colonial 
company in which upper management typically consisted of Dutch and British expatriates to a 
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truly international company pursuing the recruitment of Asians, Africans, and South-Americans. 
Further reorganizations gave the company a new governance structure, culminating in the 2005 
move of its headquarters from London to The Hague. At present, the company constitutes a 
global group of more than 2,000 energy and petrochemical companies, operating in more than 
140 countries and territories, and employing some 109,000 people. 
Telling for the present project is that Shell has a long history of off-shore oil exploration. 
In 1949 the company drilled its first sub-sea oil well in the Gulf of Mexico. In 1955 it already 
owned and operated more than 300 offshore wells. In the 1970s the company began developing 
oil fields in the North Sea. Initially this decision seemed to be a great gamble. Due to the adverse 
weather conditions and the instability of the seabed, oil exploration in that region is very difficult 
and demanded the construction of new classes of drilling platforms and storage facilities. 
Consequentially, the cost price per barrel of North Sea oil is significantly higher than that of oil 
gained from more accessible sources, and a regime of high oil prices is needed to make North Sea 
oil extraction profitable. Soon the ‘gamble’ paid off, however, due to political instability in the 
Middle East, culminating in several oil boycotts which drove up oil prices to unprecedented 
levels. With its North Sea investments in place, Shell was now in an excellent position to offer an 
alternative to Middle Eastern oil, and profited immensely as a consequence. The 1980s and 1990s 
brought continued growth for the company through acquisitions and the development of even 
more challenging offshore exploration projects. Most recently, the company has sought 
involvement in several oil and gas exploration projects in Russia, at Salym and Sakhalin. 
In the early 1990s, several of Shell’s North Sea facilities began approaching the end of 
their economic life cycles, and the company had to start devising plans for their disposal. The first 
major structure to be dismantled was the ‘Brent Spar,’ a large floating structure that was used for 
storing oil from the Brent exploration field. In 1995, after a series of decommissioning studies, 
Shell decided to sink the Spar at a disposal site in the North Atlantic. This decision soon triggered 
the greatest socio-political crisis for the company to date. Several environmentalist groups, led by 
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Greenpeace, strongly opposed Shell’s decommissioning plan. Their objections were not only 
directed at the disposal of the Spar itself, but especially at the precedent this would set for all 
other major structures to be written off in the future. Greenpeace subsequently occupied the Spar 
on April 30, 1995, attracting unprecedented media attention. Even though Shell initially decided 
to stick with the original disposal plan and evacuated the platform, a torrent of consumer 
boycotts, negative publicity, and an intervention by European ministers eventually brought the 
company to its knees after a several months-long war of attrition. In a public acknowledgement of 
its defeat, Shell announced on June 20th, 1995, that it had “decided to abandon deep-water 
disposal and seek from the UK authorities a license for onshore disposal” (Rice and Owen, 1999: 
97). In the remainder of this paper, we briefly touch upon Shell’s anticipatory activities and first-
order responses to this crisis, but our main interest lies in the company’s second-order 
adaptations, many of which did not fully materialize until years after the event. 
 
Data Collection  
To gain insight into the processes by which Shell Group adapted to the Brent Spar jolt, we chose 
a naturalistic inquiry approach (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Our principal source of data consists of a 
large number of real-life encounters with people who played an important role in either the crisis 
itself or in the organizational adaptation process that followed it. Most of these encounters 
consisted of focused research interviews (Merton & Kendall, 1946), following the usual set-up of 
a researcher asking questions, the respondent providing answers, and the researcher in turn 
recording and later transcribing them. Yet, some of these encounters followed less formal patterns 
of interaction. They unfolded as normal conversations around research visits to various Shell 
premises, after in-company trainings, or as a by-product of other academic-practitioner 
interactions. We found that especially during these less formal encounters the involved parties 
spoke more freely and typically engaged in broader observations than during formal research 
interviews. In line with ethnographic research traditions, we made these encounters accessible as 
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research data by writing up detailed ‘encounter reports,’ in virtually all cases within two days of 
the actual event (cf. Geertz, 1973). In all, this paper is based on 73 encounters: 28 with high-
ranking people at Shell, 24 with various consultants whom assisted Shell with its first- and 
second-order adaptation processes, and 21 with parties representing Shell’s civil society 
stakeholders or ‘publics.’ The length of these encounters varied from 25 minutes to well over 3 
hours, with a median duration of 70 minutes. Table 1 provides detailed information on the 
composition of our research sample. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
One of the main strengths of naturalistic research methods is that they allow for the 
combination of several different sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). In order not to “jump to 
conclusions” on the basis of a single strand of data, we triangulated (Denzin, 1989; Jick, 1979; 
Patton, 1987) our encounter reports with secondary data sources, which helped us to establish the 
reliability and convergent validity of our observations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). This 
secondary data came from two principal sources: (1) direct communications from Shell and civil 
society stakeholders like Greenpeace in the form of publications, press releases, and website 
texts; and (2) mediated messages about the conflict and its aftermath in the form of magazine and 
newspaper articles, trade and scholarly publications, teaching case studies, and several books 
written by research journalists. 
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis is often one of the least codified aspects of the qualitative research process as it is 
written down in academic articles (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1984), largely 
because surprisingly little guidance is available in the form of qualitative ‘how-to’ books. 
Qualitative researchers can only arm themselves against the ever-present danger of “death by data 
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asphyxiation” (Pettigrew, 1988; cited in Eisenhardt, 1989: 540) with a set of self-devised tools for 
reducing data and imputing relationships between variables. The researcher thus works as “a kind 
of professional do-it-yourself” person (Levi-Strauss, 1962: 17) as he or she crafts plausible but 
often improvised procedures for connecting data to conclusions. 
In addition to such inevitable acts of ‘bricolage’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998), we largely 
follow a set of procedures in this study that have been pioneered by researchers like Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997), Burgelman (1983), and Van Maanen (1988). First, we used NVivo software to 
create a database of our encounter reports (formal interview transcripts as well as informal 
conversation notes), indexed by sector (Shell, consultant, or civil society organization), 
respondent number, and chronological order. Second, using this primary data, we drafted three 
initial vignettes (“focused description[s] of a series of events taken to be representative, typical, 
or emblematic in the case [one is] doing;” Miles & Huberman, 1994: 81) which told and retold 
Shell’s organizational adaptation story in different terms, each highlighting specific events and 
phenomena. Third, we went back to the organizational literature, and selected three alternate 
theoretical frameworks on the basis of their fit with each of the three vignettes (the ‘stakeholder,’ 
‘legitimacy,’ and ‘capability’ templates). Fourth, and finally, in a series of subsequent iterations 
we went back and forth between the theory and our data, continuously rewriting our vignettes and 
bringing in data from secondary sources in order to optimize the conceptual and empirical fit 
between observations and reflections.  
 
Alternate Templates Design 
As stated, we refrained from providing a singular ‘official’ reading of our research finding, and 
instead decided to write up three complementary vignettes. Such an alternate templates design is a 
sensemaking strategy whereby an analyst deliberately proposes several alternative interpretations 
of the same naturalistic data, based on different sets of theoretical premises (Langley, 1999). The 
purpose of the design is to assess the extent to which each theoretical template furnishes a 
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suitable explanation for the observed phenomena (cf. Allison, 1969; Collis, 1991; Lapointe and 
Rivard, 2007). Given the complexity of our research topic, and the amount of primary and 
secondary data that exist about it, we opted for the alternate templates strategy because it provides 
a way of dealing with the richness of the data without getting lost in them. As Langley (1999) 
puts it: “Overall this strategy combines both richness and theoretical parsimony (simplicity) by 
decomposing the problem. Qualitative nuances are presented through the alternative explanations, 
and theoretical clarity is maintained by keeping the different theoretical lenses separate (…) 
Between them, then, different theoretical perspectives provide overall accuracy, although each 
one is inaccurate on its own” (p. 699).  
 
RESULTS: THREE VIGNETTES 
 
We report our results in the form of three vignettes, ‘short stories’ about our focal company which 
weave together the actions and decisions of the protagonist and the antagonists into a storyline or 
‘plot’ (Ricoeur, 1984). The fact that multiple vignettes are available captures an essential quality 
of storytelling, notably that of each tale multiple accounts are likely to exist that struggle amongst 
one another for dominance (Boje, 1991). Each vignette is half-empirical, half-theoretical in that it 
uses a specific theoretical lens to carve out a theoretically meaningful slice of ‘reality.’ This lens 
focuses our understanding on specific ‘facts’ and allows us to conveniently ignore others, which 
are then left to be picked up by another lens. This theoretically-laden selectivity makes the 
vignette an analytical device rather than an instrument of synthesis. It helps us gain a better partial 
understanding of the world, only to postpone the integration of that partial view with a broader, 
more empirically well-rounded world-view until later (cf. Heugens et al., 2004). Vignettes thus 
precede and call for a later synthesizing exercise. Here we present three vignettes on Shell’s 
dealings with the Brent Spar crisis: (1) a stakeholder vignette, (2) a legitimacy vignette, and (3) a 
capability vignette. These vignettes were especially selected in terms of the locus of their 
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analyses, as they range from a wholly external perspective (stakeholders) through a mixed-mode 
perspective (legitimacy) to a wholly internal perspective (capabilities). We ‘tell’ these vignettes 
along the episodic lines suggested by Meyer (1982). Factual statements can be traced to the 
respondents presented in Table 1 via superscript references. 
 
Vignette 1: Stakeholders 
The first perspective we selected to analyze Shell’s adaptation process is a stakeholder lens. A 
stakeholder is commonly defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46). Seen from the focal 
organization, there are two broad reasons for granting any specific party stakeholder status. The 
first is prudence. The focal organization is well-advised for practical reasons to denote as its 
stakeholders those parties that have the power to directly or indirectly withhold or control 
resources that are of crucial importance for maintaining the organization’s effectiveness 
(Frooman, 1999). The second is moral obligation. Organizations may, often in a more 
discretionary sense, allow stakeholder status to those parties with whom they are involved in 
some broad scheme of fairness (Phillips, 1997) or in a more confined normatively-laden 
contractual relation (van Oosterhout et al., 2006). The stakeholder lens is by no means 
omniscient, but it usefully directs our attention to the process whereby the extant stakeholder set 
of our focal firm was broadened to include a completely new set of parties with whom it 
previously entertained no relationship.  
 Anticipation. In a somewhat loving sense, Shell people tend to refer to their own 
managers as “technocrats”.S11, S22 Shell has always defined itself as a technology-driven company, 
whose unique core competencies lie in the exploration of oil under difficult and challenging 
circumstances that tend to shy away less technologically advanced oil companies.S13 More so than 
in the case of many of its competitors, this has restricted Shell’s immediate stakeholder focus on 
its immediate task environment. For Shell managers, “stakeholders” had always been national and 
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supranational governments and their offices who upheld the law and extended commissions for 
oil exploration in areas under their jurisdiction, the company’s legal and technical consultants 
who aided it in solving complex problems, and a loyal ‘family’ of subcontractors and franchisees 
providing services like engineering, shipping, cleaning, and surveillance. That a broader set of 
parties could ultimately exercise a decisive influence on how the company operated its core 
technologies really never quite dawned on them until the Brent Spar Crisis.S06, C07, P11 As one Shell 
manager put it: “We asked ourselves, is this the right thing to do technically? Is it legal? Have we 
dotted our I’s and crossed our T’s and asked the permission of the organizations whose 
permission is required?”S03  
 First-order response. Shell ultimately could not maintain its self-selected isolationist 
policy. New stakeholders literally forced themselves upon the company by occupying its assets. It 
took Shell wholly by surprise. As one Shell executive put it to us well after the events: “We 
thought all greens were blue, like Prince Phillip, who chairs a World Wildlife Fund meeting in the 
morning on how to save the panda in China and then goes on in the afternoon and shoots deer in 
his private park. It completely escaped us that there are also red greens, ex-leftists that have 
reconverted to radical environmentalism, and green greens, whom are the critical ecology 
greens.”S05 Confronted with the unforeseen Greenpeace reaction, Shell chose the technocrat’s 
solution and tried to radically buffer the new stakeholders from its technical core. It sued 
Greenpeace in the Scottish Court of Session, demanding the summary ejection of the protestors; it 
evacuated and reoccupied the Brent Spar with the help of “security officers” and the police; it 
furnished more scientists to present evidence that the deep sea disposal option it had selected was 
indeed the best practicable one; and it feverishly hired more communications consultants to ‘fix’ 
the public relations mess it had created.C02, C04 When the company finally submitted to 
Greenpeace’ demands some two months after the start of the occupation, the company’s 
managers were still fumbling in the dark as to whether they should broaden their definitions of 
who were their stakeholders.S04
 16
 Second-order responses. After the decision was made to dispose of the Spar on-shore, 
public interest in the issue inevitably ebbed away. But all was not well for Shell. It was not only 
stuck with a solution that was roughly four times as expensive as the original plan (estimated to 
be £46 million versus £11.8 for deep-sea disposal; Rice and Owen, 1999), it had also suffered 
revenue drops of up to 30 percent (in Germany) due to consumer boycotts (Engber, 2006), as well 
as immeasurable reputation damage. Many Shell managers found that they fundamentally had to 
broaden the set of stakeholders they involved in their day-to-day affairs, and that the company 
had to develop instruments for managing these new relationships.S01 In the years that followed the 
crisis, through an extensive trial-and-error learning process, Shell developed two instruments for 
engaging with new stakeholder groups while simultaneously delineating its obligations towards 
them: (1) issue portfolios and (2) key performance indicators.C01, C05  
 It was quite confrontational for Shell managers to experience that “Greenpeace was much 
better prepared than we were to fight the public relations battle surrounding the Brent Spar 
episode.”S20 One important implication they derived from the affair was that they “had to start 
picking their fights” in the sense of matching their stakeholder management efforts with their core 
strengths and areas of attention.S17, C06 Through a process of vicarious learning encompassing 
several years, Shell began stipulating and demarcating its responsibilities vis-à-vis its societal 
stakeholders by creating an ‘issue portfolio’ (taking its inspiration from Greenpeace as well as 
from more issue-savvy companies like Dow Chemical): a closed-ended list of issues for which 
the company had formulated a position statement, acknowledged partial responsibility, and 
envisaged a roadmap towards (partial) resolution.C07, C14 In February 2007, Shell’s issue portfolio 
contained the following issues: climate change, product stewardship, business integrity, personnel 
safety, community relations, corruption, and globalization (www.shell.com). There is no denying 
that this is a formidable list. But is delineated. One consultant outlined to us that by adhering to 
this list with almost religious fervor, the company sort of says: “These are our core 
responsibilities. Other issues are not our concern. Please contact BP or your local government. 
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Good luck.”C16 In other words, issue portfolios are a first instrument by which Shell seeks to 
demarcate its responsibilities towards new stakeholder groups. 
 Shell managers also seek to delineate their responsibilities towards stakeholders with 
respect to the issues that have made it to the issue portfolio. For this purpose they use issue-
specific key performance indicators (KPIs): metrics to quantify the company’s performance on its 
self-selected issues, to be used in both its internal management control systems and external 
communications.S08 For example, with respect to the issue of climate change, the company uses 
KPIs like: total greenhouse gas emissions, energy efficiency of oil and gas production, and total 
amount of natural gas ‘flared’ (i.e., burned for lack of a better use) during exploration and 
production of oil. There are a number of rationales behind the use of KPIs. First, it is a clear 
attempt to gain control over the environmental standards of effectiveness against which the 
performance of the firm is assessed (cf. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Second, KPIs are a kind of 
desensitizing device in that they potentially allow for an objective discussion on subjects about 
which two parties may disagree. Third, and most importantly, KPIs are again a kind of 
responsibility delineation tool – they stipulate a finite number of metrics the organizations is 
willing to be held accountable for, declaring other metrics less relevant. 
 
Vignette 2: Legitimacy 
The second perspective we chose to analyze Shell’s adaptation efforts is a legitimacy lens. One 
widely accepted definition of legitimacy suggests that it is: “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). For our 
present purposes, it is important to distinguish between two types of legitimacy. The first is 
pragmatic legitimacy. This type rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization’s most 
immediate constituents (Suchman, 1995), and it entails the continued support on which an 
organization can count as long as it nurtures its interdependencies with these constituents 
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(Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The second is moral legitimacy. This type refers to a 
positive normative evaluation of the organization itself or of its objectives (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Scott, 2001). Moral legitimacy contrasts sharply with pragmatic legitimacy in that it does not rest 
on a self-interested evaluation of a given activity, but rather on whether it is “the right thing to 
do” (Suchman, 1995: 579). One should not expect the legitimacy lens to provide a comprehensive 
account of the situation, but it helpfully directs our attention to a possible shift in terms of the 
criteria by which our focal organization was judged. 
 Anticipation. In preparation for its efforts to dispose of the Brent Spar, Shell had 
exclusively sought for ways to legitimize its intended actions on pragmatic grounds. The 
company wanted to dispose of the structure that was taken out of commission in October 1991. 
As storage buoys have limited recycling value, the simplest and cheapest way to dispose of them 
is to topple them where they stand or drag them to deep water and sink them there (Rice & Owen, 
1999). Deep sea disposal soon etched itself in the mind of Shell’s managers as the most preferred 
solution, making the remainder of the trajectory seem straightforward: the Brent Spar stood in the 
UK sector of the North Sea, so they merely required the permission of the UK government to go 
forward with their plans. Under British law, Shell had to go through a legalistic procedure to 
demonstrate that deep water disposal was in fact the Best Practicable Environmental Option 
(BPEO). The procedure consisted of several steps, including the exploration of alternative 
options, comparing them on criteria like engineering complexity, risk to the workforce, cost, and 
environmental impact.P01 The BPEO procedure became Shell’s sole point of attention. Crucially, 
it did not publicize its intended disposal option before the operation commenced. By denying 
itself this option, Shell essentially cut off the possibility of testing the public sentiment about 
alternate ways of disposal.C04 Consequentially, Shell had no idea how deep the opposition to the 
deep sea disposal plan ran. 
First-order response. Shell’s commitment to action grounded in pragmatic legitimacy 
backfired dramatically. Not only were the pragmatic reasons in favor of the deep water disposal 
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option challenged by environmentalists; they also attacked the company on moral grounds. In 
April 1995 Greenpeace published the report No Grounds for Dumping (Reddy, 1995), in which it 
evaluated several decommissioning options for the Brent Spar, including scenarios like “walk 
away” (leaving the platforms in situ) and “rigs to reefs” (disposal in shallow water to turn the rig 
into an artificial reef). The report discarded all alternate options to the on-shore removal option on 
rational grounds. The invoked arguments included the other options’ larger potential damage to 
the environment and their illegality under the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, as 
well as the on-shore option’s positive impact on employment in the declining offshore 
construction industry and the technical feasibility of this option as demonstrated by the prior 
removal of several hundreds of platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Less directly understood by 
Shell’s managers was that Greenpeace also questioned the company’s moral legitimacy.P02 Most 
pressingly, Greenpeace stressed that the higher monetary cost of the on-shore option could not 
legitimately be used as a reason for dumping waste by a company that habitually realized multi-
billion dollar profits. In its first-order response, Shell completely ignored this threat to its moral 
legitimacy, and defended itself strictly on pragmatic grounds. It made considerable play of the 
fact that it had commissioned some 30 separate reports by specialist consultants prior to deciding 
to sink the Spar in deep water. As the company started and stubbornly persisted in its mudslinging 
contest with Greenpeace over scientific facts, it became rapidly clear to outside observers that 
Shell had let itself be lured into a public relations war it could not win.C03, P17
 Second-order responses. In the years that followed the passing of the event, it began to 
dawn on Shell managers – doubtlessly supported in their sensemaking efforts by the numerous 
communication consultants they hired to help them identify the causes for the fiasco – that to 
retain their societal license to operate, their company needed to ground its actions not just in 
pragmatic legitimacy, but also in moral legitimacy.S01, S09 Shell’s managers had sufficient social 
intelligence to realize that any attempts to ‘acquire’ moral legitimacy quickly or ‘on the cheap’ 
through, for example, heightened attention to its extant philanthropy and corporate community 
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involvement programs were likely to ricochet. Instead, the company adopted a longer-term and 
certainly more gradual three-pronged policy to establish its moral grounds for existence: (1) 
greater emphasis on the company’s core purpose; (2) increased outward transparency; and (3) 
image consolidation.S11, S15  
 Soon after the public attention to the jolt began to wane, the company started with a soul-
searching exercise, to identify which claims it could lay on moral legitimacy. To lead the exercise 
it hired Jim Collins – a fortunate casting choice for a long view organization, as Collins is the co-
author of the management best-seller Built to Last. The outcome of the process was threefold. It 
lead to a new identity statement – “Make a difference” – which was meant to stress both 
internally and externally that the world would be worse off without Shell. It also culminated in a 
new core purpose statement – “Helping people create a better world” – which underwrote the 
company’s intention to facilitate morally just actions by its workforce towards society. In fact, the 
company had the intention to “create Shell ‘ambassadors’ out of every employee” (Oechsle & 
Henderson, 2000: 75). Finally, it also updated its “Shell General Business Principles” – the 
company’s code of ethics – for the first time since their inception in 1976 – to restore their fit 
with the company’s changing institutional environment.  
A further insight that materialized in the minds of Shell management was that to earn 
moral legitimacy, the company had to become drastically more transparent towards the outside 
world.S12, C01 The Brent Spar episode and the corresponding threats to the corporation’s moral 
standing could probably have been prevented entirely had the company been more open about its 
intended disposal plans well before the removal process commenced. To create more openness, 
Shell began in 1997 to publish an annual social report in which it outlined the company’s impact 
on its natural and social environment.C02, S06 Whereas the practice of social reporting was not 
exactly new, the company was one of the first to seek third-party verification of the performance 
it reported against its own KPIs by audit firms like KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Shell 
managers strongly believed in the importance of having their claims audited. In the words of one 
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of them: “By making your performance claims testable, and by writing testability into your 
reports, you reduce the possibility of being attacked unfairly. At the very least you make sure that 
there is an objective ‘other side to the story’ which has been checked on its facts.”S03
Finally, to minimize the risk of future legitimacy loss, the company tried to consolidate 
its public image and the legitimacy claims it put forward. At the time of the Brent Spar crisis, 
Shell Group consisted of more than 3,000 operating entities. Many of them were immediately 
recognizable as Shell entities, as 95% of the group’s assets were invested in firms carrying the 
Shell name. The loosely federative structure of the group certainly contributed to the escalation of 
the crisis. As one Shell manager shared with us: “We were confronted with the problem of being 
a multinational characterized by a loose association of companies. At the height of the crisis, 
Shell UK [the company that administered the Spar] still thought it was pursuing a just course of 
action, as it enjoyed the full backing of the UK authorities. At the same time, thousands of upset 
consumers sent angry letters to Shell Germany and Shell Netherlands, and violent consumer 
boycotts [also involving sabotage and arson attempts directed at German gas stations] were 
unfolding in continental Europe.”S06 To regain control, Shell’s top management reduced its 
number of operating units to 2,200 and presently employs less than half of its capital in firms 
carrying the Shell name. 
 
Vignette 3: Capabilities 
The third perspective we selected to interpret Shell’s adaptation process is a capabilities lens. 
Organizational (dynamic) capabilities draw on the organizational resource pool and sometimes on 
that of the firm’s network partners, such that they allow managers to: “integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece 
et al., 1997: 516). Though this may seem abstract, capabilities actually consist of identifiable and 
specific organizational processes which help organizations achieve new resource configurations 
in order to overcome new challenges imposed by their market and non-market environments 
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(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Lampel and Shamsie, 2003). One aspect of capabilities that is of 
particular importance to the current project is that they entail path dependence. For any firm, but 
for a long view organization in particular, “previous investments and its repertoire of routines (its 
‘history’) constrain its future behavior” (Teece et al., 1997: 522-23). The capabilities lens can of 
course only provide a partial take on issues of organizational adaptation, but it does usefully 
direct our attention to how first-order changes can be severely constrained and even misguided by 
extant resource pools, which can in turn only be adjusted through arduous and lengthy processes 
of second-order adaptation. 
 Anticipation. Regardless of all that has been written about Shell, the company was not 
wholly unprepared for a public relations crisis. In fact, the company had a complex ‘external 
affairs’ (EA) structure – which is how Shell denotes its public affairs function – in place well 
before the jolt struck the company.S02 The company employed some 400 EA professionals at the 
time. Three characteristics of the pre-Brent Spar EA organization are noteworthy. First, the 
function was highly decentralized. The bulk of the corporation’s EA expertise was concentrated 
in its operating units and country organizations, and these lower-level functionaries enjoyed a 
great level of autonomy and delegated decision authority, in line with Shell’s business philosophy 
that local problems ought to be addressed locally. Second, all EA capabilities were fully ‘locked 
up’ in staff offices, in the sense that line managers never communicated with the media or with 
interested stakeholder groups directly, but directed all communication tasks to EA professionals. 
Finally, Shell’s human resource practices at the time were that EA management was a terminal 
function, in the sense that individuals who were recruited as EA functionaries could normally 
expect to spend their entire career in various EA positions.S02, C15
 First-order response. Shell’s first-order response was clearly hampered by the 
organization’s decentralized EA structure. In the words of one executive: “after the event, we had 
to rethink our local approach of the event. We were captives of our own external affairs 
organization. We waited far too long before making this whole affair a group-level issue.”S03 As 
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the event unfolded, Shell UK persisted in its sole ownership of the issue. Working towards a 
‘local solution,’ its EA personnel were trying to resolve the issue with help of legal means and 
law enforcement, and persisted in factual quarrels with Greenpeace over issues like the amount of 
oil, PCBs, and other ‘nasties’ still left in the Brent Spar (it was established after the event that 
Shell’s original estimates of these quantities, which had so vigorously been contested by 
Greenpeace, were in fact on all major points correct). Meanwhile, the rest of Europe burnt. Ritt 
Bjerregaard, EU Commissioner for the Environment, stated on Danish television that “most 
countries in Europe think [dumping the Spar] is dirty and should be stopped (…) it is good that 
Greenpeace is around to ensure these things do not go on secretly.” At the fourth North Sea 
Conference, starting in Esbjerg on June 7, 1995, ministers from Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, 
Germany and the Netherlands attacked Britain for granting permission to dispose of the Brent 
Spar in deep sea. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl even turned to British Prime Minister John 
Major directly and stated: “my urgent advice is not to do it.” When Shell Headquarters finally 
took control over the issue, the public relations battle over the Spar could no longer be won.C04  
 Second-order responses. In the years after the event, Shell crafted two second-order 
responses that were aimed, respectively, at the quality and the architecture of its EA capabilities. 
To improve their quality, Shell started a considerable in-house training and capability 
development program. From 1998 onwards, Shell began bringing together its best-and-brightest 
EA managers in classes of about 25 for annual instruction in the latest EA models and techniques 
at its London campus. To a large extent, this effort was oriented at increasing the human capital 
of its EA functionaries. But there was also a second-purpose. As the chair of the training program 
told us during one of the sessions: “We are closely monitoring these young men and women with 
respect to their intelligence and ability. Each year, we select a number of them for the most senior 
EA jobs in the company, at our London Group EA Unit. Many others will move on to become 
senior business managers in their respective country organizations.”S02 In other words, Shell 
actively began to assign EA managers to line functions in many parts of the country. Whereas it 
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used to be the case that most senior managers were engineers who were unaccustomed to 
communicate with outsiders, Shell now slowly became to be infused with a new stock of line 
managers who knew from experience how it was to deal with the media and with stakeholders. 
 In terms of the architecture of its EA capabilities, the company radically broke with its 
full decentralization tradition.S02, S11 In the new EA setup, the company began to experiment with 
a cascaded capabilities organization. Only the smallest, local problems remained to be resolved at 
the decentralized level. Whenever a crisis grew beyond a localized event in terms of the attention 
paid to it by the international media, the company would denote it as a “business issue.” In 
practice, this meant that the London office would compile an interdisciplinary issue management 
team that became responsible for handling the crisis. Over the years, it has developed a detailed 
database outlining the specific competencies of 400 of its international EA employees, such that 
useful teams can be compiled per issue or event.S03, S15 Events of the highest order – as the Brent 
Spar once was – are now denoted corporate issues. These are managed wholly, and much sooner 
than in the past, from the London-based Group EA Unit.S05  
 
SYNTHESIS: ADAPTATION BY LONG-VIEW ORGANIZATIONS 
 
So how do long view organizations adapt to environmental jolts? The three vignettes each 
provide a narrative account of how such organizations furnish first- and second-order responses to 
jolts (Meyer, 1982) or strategic surprises (Lampel and Shapira, 2001) emanating from their 
environments. But since vignettes are analytic devices which each represent a specific take on the 
evidence, they are closer to a collection of separate sub-studies than to a single integrated study 
with convergent findings (cf. Yin, 2003: 97-101). They therefore call for a synthesizing effort to 
draw implications across the individual narratives. Here, we develop synthesizing conjectures 
along three different lines, notably about long view organizations’: (1) first-order adaptations; (2) 
second-order adaptations; and (3) first- and second-order adaptations combined. 
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First-order Adaptations and Organizational Trajectories 
Long-view organizations are more than alternate organizational forms tied to path-dependent 
trajectories, which make them unable to shake off the effects of past decisions and which limit the 
feasible set of future action alternatives to those that ‘fit together’ with their present technologies 
and administrative rule structures (cf. David, 1994: 213-15). In all three vignettes, we found 
evidence of how the preparations the organization made during the anticipatory phase forced it 
onto a history-bound trajectory that virtually dictated its first-order responses. First, nominally 
independent parties that were historically involved in the application of the organization’s core 
technology continued to receive the better part of the attention it paid to outside constituencies 
during the crisis, seemingly irrespective of the modest role they played in it. Second, the company 
was evidently unable to shed its decades-long reliance on pragmatic legitimacy to justify its 
actions when it was confronted with a jolt that questioned the very basis of that pragmatism. 
Third, by ‘locking up’ its EA capabilities in staff departments with which line managers were not 
supposed to interact, the organization effectively put on a Janus-face which looked one way when 
it came to justifying its existence and often to the exact opposite direction when it came to 
guiding practical action. To sum up, in all three vignettes we found evidence of organizational 
trajectories dictating responses, such that any adaptive effort was more likely to be selected on the 
basis of its coherence with the organizational past than on grounds of its fit with the jolt at hand. 
See Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: Long view organizations are more likely than other organizational types 
to engage in past-coherent rather than jolt-specific first-order adaptations. 
 
Second-order Adaptations and Organizational Technology 
In readjusting organizational life after being confronted with an environmental jolt (Meyer, 1982) 
or strategic surprise (Lampel and Shapira, 2001), second-order adaptations serve the role of 
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durably restoring the fit between the organization’s internal structure and systems on the one hand 
and the demands emanating from its environment on the other (Drazin and van de Ven, 1995). To 
restore fit, organizations have two basic options at their disposal: bridging and buffering (Meznar 
and Nigh, 1995). When bridging, organizations attempt to reestablish fit by altering their core 
technologies and associated activities until they again meet environmental demands. In contrast, 
buffering entails a process whereby organizations seek to regain fit by controlling and managing 
these environmental factors directly (cf. Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Thompson, 1967). In all three 
vignettes, we found considerable emphasis on buffering. Through the stipulation of KPIs and 
issue portfolios, the organization sought to control its stakeholder environment rather than engage 
in a completely open dialogue with it. With respect to the company’s attempts to establish greater 
moral legitimacy, it is telling that it focused on creating greater transparency concerning its means 
and motives rather than altering these means and motives themselves. In terms of the changes it 
made to its stock of capabilities, it is informative that it focused almost exclusively on its EA 
capabilities, but did very little to bring about or speed up any changes to its core technology. 
What these insights add to the existing literature is that in addition to known antecedents of 
buffering like resource importance and size (cf. Meznar and Nigh, 1995), technological 
complexity and intensity also seem to favor adaptation attempts that focus on altering and 
controlling external rather than internal environments. See Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2: Long view organizations are more likely than other organizational types 
to engage in buffering- rather than bridging-style second-order adaptations. 
 
Organizational Adaptations and Identity Inertia 
Organizational scientists have long argued that organizational identity – a social collective’s 
answer to the ‘who are we?’ question – determines the amount of attention an organization pays 
to a given jolt (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001), influences its definition of it (Glynn, 2000), and 
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shapes its responses to it (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). It has been suggested that to respond 
effectively to environmental jolts, an organization’s identity must to a certain extent be dynamic 
and mutable. Without some minimal degree of adaptive instability, an “organization would find 
itself trapped with an inevitably stagnant identity, unprepared to address demands that might have 
survival implications” (Gioia et al., 2000: 74). Strong identities can then perversely act as biased 
filters leading to misperception, misclassification, and misinterpretation of aspects of the external 
environment, a phenomenon which has alternatively been denoted as “dominant logic,” 
“collective blindness,” “frames of reference,” and “interpretive schemes” in the literature (Walsh, 
1995: 284-285). In all three vignettes, we indeed found a notable absence of adaptive instability, 
as all the organization’s first- and second-order responses seemed fully coherent with an inert 
organizational self-definition as a technocratic, technology-driven, engineer-lead, and control-
oriented company. In its first-order responses, the organization persisted in its attempts to manage 
the crisis ‘according to plan,’ even when it had become abundantly clear to most outsiders that the 
contingency required a drastically different approach. With respect to its second-order responses, 
it is telling that to achieve its goals of reaching out to stakeholders, building moral legitimacy, 
and developing its EA potential, the company’s response in all three cases was to design and 
build complex, sophisticated, technology-intense management systems in an attempt to control all 
eventualities. What these findings suggests is that technologically complex and intense 
organizations are more likely than representatives of other organizational types to become 
attached to relatively stable identity frames. In other words, it seems hard to develop a mutable 
identity in the face of an immutable core technology. See Proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3: Long view organizations are more likely than other organizational types 
to be hampered in their adaptive abilities by inert organizational identities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
More so than representatives of other organizational types, long view organizations are relatively 
inflexible creatures, due to their long term commitment to complex and intense technologies. Yet 
they are by no means immune to environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982) or strategic surprises (Lampel 
and Shapira, 2001). This raises the question as to how such organizations adapt to sudden 
environmental changes. A longitudinal alternate templates study (Langley, 1999) of Shell 
Group’s dealings with the Brent Spar crisis showed that long view organizations tend to respond 
to jolts in several unique ways. First, in their first-order responses they are strongly bounded to 
previously chosen technological trajectories (David, 1994). Due to their deep commitment to 
long-standing core technologies, their initial adaptations to crises tend to reflect coherence with 
their technical cores rather than with the demands of the event at hand. Second, their second-order 
responses tend to center on buffering rather than bridging (Meznar and Nigh, 1994). Hampered as 
they are by low-modularity core technologies (Schilling, 2000), they are naturally drawn to fit 
restoration attempts that change their external rather than their internal environments. Third, both 
their first- and second-order adaptations carry the imprint of relatively inert identity frames (cf. 
Gioia et al., 2000), ingrained in each long view organization through a long-standing commitment 
to unalterable core technologies and exacting external dependencies. In sum, irrespective of the 
aura of might and status that surrounds many long-view organizations, their repertoire of adaptive 
responses is in fact limited by a formidable set of constraints, making the prolonged survival of 
any such organization in particular a highly remarkable feat.  
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Table 1: Listing of Research Participants 
 
Number Organization Job Title Timing Meetings 
S01* Shell Group CEO 2004, 2005 2 
S02 Shell Group Group External Affairs Trainer 2004 1 
S03 Shell Group Issue Manager 1995 1 
S04 Shell Group Visiting Professor of Scenarios 
and Corporate Strategy 
1996 1 
S05 Shell Group Group Policy and External 
Relations 
2004 1 
S06 Royal Dutch Shell Issue Manager 1999, 2001 2 
S07 Royal Dutch Shell External Communications Advisor 2004 1 
S08 Shell International Issues Advisor 2004 1 
S09 Shell Chemicals Resolution Performance Products 2001 1 
S10 Shell Downstream Internal Media Manager 2004 1 
S11 Shell Hydrogen External Affairs and 
Communication Manager 
2004, 2005 3 
S12 Shell Solar External Affairs and 
Communication Manager 
2004 1 
S13 Shell Exploration & Production 
International 
External Affairs Advisor 2007 1 
S14 Nederlandse Aardoliemaatschappij Manager Media Relations 2004 1 
S15 Deutsche Shell External Affairs Central Europe 2004 1 
S16 Shell Brasil Reputation manager 2004 1 
S17 Shell Bulgaria HR Director 2004 1 
S18 Shell Gabon Director of Public Relations 2004 1 
S19 Shell Kenya External Affairs Manager 2004 1 
S20 Shell Nigeria Manager Government and Public 
Relations 
2004 1 
S21 Shell Representative Office Oman External Affairs Manager 2004 1 
S22 Shell Oceania Corporate Communications 
Manager 
2004 1 
S23 Shell Pakistan External Affairs Manager 2004 1 
S24 Shell Philippines Regional Communications 
Advisor 
2004 1 
C01 KPMG Integrity Consulting Partner 1997, 1999 2 
C02 KPMG Integrity Consulting Senior Consultant 1999, 2001, 
2005 
3 
C03 KPMG Staffing & Facility 
Services 
Manager Public Relations & 
Public Affairs 
2001, 2004 2 
C04 Hill & Knowlton Senior Consultant 2003 1 
C05 Bersay Strategic Communications 
Consultancy  
President 2001 1 
C06 McKinsey & Company Consultant 1997 1 
C07 Boer & Croon Corporate 
Communication 
Partner 1999, 2003, 
2005 
3 
C08 Boer & Croon Corporate 
Communication 
Partner 2005 1 
C09 Boer & Croon Corporate 
Communication 
Consultant 2005 2 
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C10 Boer & Croon Corporate 
Communication 
Consultant 2006 1 
C11 Schuttelaar & Partners Consultant 1998, 1999 2 
C12 Independent consultancy Issue manager 2004 1 
C13 Independent consultancy Communication advisor 1997 1 
C14 Independent consultancy Risk Communication Consultant 2003 1 
C15 Independent consultancy PR Consultant 2003 1 
C16 Independent consultancy Managing Director 1999 1 
P01 Greenpeace Campaign Manager 1998 1 
P02 Greenpeace Oil Campaigner 1997 1 
P03 Consumer & Biotechnology Associate 1998 1 
P04 Dutch Consumers League Policy Coordinator 1999 1 
P05 Issue Management Council President 2001 1 
P06 Foundation for Public Affairs Executive Director 2003 1 
P07 Sustainable Industry: A California 
Public Benefit Corporation 
Research Director 2001 1 
P08 Het Financieele Dagblad (Dutch 
daily newspaper) 
Editor 1998 1 
P09 De Volkskrant (Dutch daily 
newspaper) 
Editor 1999 1 
P10 European Academy of Business in 
Society 
President  1 
P11 Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Directorate of 
Communication 
Coordinator Speeches 2000, 2004 2 
P12 Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Directorate of Industry 
and Services 
Coordinator Biotechnology 1998 1 
P13 Dutch Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water 
Management 
Strategy Advisor 2002 1 
P14 Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature Management and Fisheries 
Policy Coordinator 1998 1 
P15 Holland International Distribution 
Council 
PR Officer 2002, 2006 2 
P16 Dutch Normalization Institute Consultant Industry Division 1999 1 
P17 DSM Senior External Communications  1998 1 
P18 DSM Director of Public Affairs 1998 1 
P19 Strukton Railinfra Advisor 2002 1 
Total: 73 
* ‘S’, ‘C’, and ‘P’ denote encounters with, respectively, respondents from ‘Shell,’ ‘consultants to 
Shell,’ and ‘publics of Shell’  
 
 
 36
Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance” 
 
2007 
 
Leadership Behaviour and Upward Feedback: Findings From a Longitudinal Intervention 
Dirk van Dierendonck, Clare Haynes, Carol Borrill and Chris Stride 
ERS-2007-003-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8579
 
The Clean Development Mechanism: Institutionalizing New Power Relations 
Bettina B.F. Wittneben 
ERS-2007-004-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8582
 
How Today’s Consumers Perceive Tomorrow’s Smart Products 
Serge A. Rijsdijk and Erik Jan Hultink 
ERS-2007-005-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8984
 
Product Intelligence: Its Conceptualization, Measurement and Impact on Consumer Satisfaction 
Serge A. Rijsdijk, Erik Jan Hultink and Adamantios Diamantopoulos 
ERS-2007-006-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8580
 
Testing the Strength of the Iron Cage: A Meta-Analysis of Neo-Institutional Theory 
Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens and Michel Lander 
ERS-2007-007-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8581
 
Export Orientation among New Ventures and Economic Growth 
S. Jolanda A. Hessels and André van Stel 
ERS-2007-008-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8583
 
Allocation and Productivity of Time in New Ventures of Female and Male Entrepreneurs 
Ingrid Verheul, Martin Carree and Roy Thurik 
ERS-2007-009-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8989
 
Cooperating if one’s Goals are Collective-Based: Social Identification Effects in Social Dilemmas as a Function of Goal-Transformation 
David De Cremer, Daan van Knippenberg, Eric van Dijk and Esther van Leeuwen 
ERS-2007-010-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9041
 
Unfit to Learn? How Long View Organizations Adapt to Environmental Jolts 
Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens and Stelios C. Zyglidopoulos 
ERS-2007-014-ORG 
 
 
Going, Going, Gone. Innovation and Exit in Manufacturing Firms 
Elena Cefis and Orietta Marsili 
ERS-2007-015-ORG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
